Globalization and Natural-Resource Conflicts by Pegg, Scott
Naval War College Review
Volume 56
Number 4 Autumn Article 7
2003
Globalization and Natural-Resource Conflicts
Scott Pegg
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pegg, Scott (2003) "Globalization and Natural-Resource Conflicts," Naval War College Review: Vol. 56 : No. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss4/7
GLOBALIZATION AND NATURAL-RESOURCE CONFLICTS
Scott Pegg
High-profile recent conflicts involving lucrative natural resources in suchcountries as Angola and Sierra Leone have drawn increasing attention to
the link between natural resources and violence. While recent strategic, media,
and academic attention has understandably focused on Iraq, the United States
currently imports 15 percent of its crude oil from Africa, a figure that is forecast
to increase to 25 percent by 2015. The Gulf of Guinea is poised to grow in strate-
gic importance for the United States, and senior military and diplomatic offi-
cials are reportedly in advanced discussions with São Tomé e Principe about
establishing a regional U.S. Navy base there.1 This arti-
cle argues that natural resource–related conflicts in
places like West and Central Africa are not well under-
stood. While such conflicts are unlikely to pose sub-
stantive operational risks to U.S. military forces, a
failure to understand the dynamics underlying them
risks exposing U.S. forces to smaller-scale Somalia-
like military problems and, perhaps more importantly,
to serious public relations and reputational risks.
One of the factors that makes natural-resource
conflicts especially noteworthy is the alleged role
played in them by leading private-sector actors. The
sovereign governments of Angola and Sierra Leone
both hired the services of Executive Outcomes, a pri-
vate military company. De Beers has faced mounting
pressure over its purchase of diamonds from these
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war-torn areas. Oil companies in Burma, Colombia, Nigeria, and the Sudan have
been directly linked to state violence against local host communities.
Traditional security studies have generally neglected profit-oriented natural-
resource conflicts. One recent large-scale empirical survey on conflict notes
that nine of the thirteen wars identified in 1998 took place in Africa. Its au-
thors posit that “this might be related to the phenomenon of weak states, to the
increased erosion of boundaries, and to open or clandestine intervention from
neighboring countries.”2 They make no mention of any role that natural re-
sources or private-sector involvement might play in generating these conflicts.
Similarly, this project limits its definition of armed conflicts to conflicts that
result “in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”3 Thus, it lists no armed conflicts for
Nigeria, because the thousands of fatalities suffered in recent years by groups
like the Ijaw and Ogoni in violence surrounding oil extraction in the Niger
Delta are not considered “battle related.” Policy makers and senior members of
Western armed forces might be inadvertently misled by such studies into
thinking that resource-rich West African countries are far more peaceful than
they really are. With a broadening, or loosening, of this “battle related” crite-
rion, the Ogoni from 1993 to 1995 and the Ijaw from 1998 to 2001 would merit
inclusion under this survey’s categories of “intermediate armed conflict” or
even of “war.”4
The cited survey also limits itself to two types of conflict—incompatibility
concerning government and concerning territory. As there is no category for
wars to control natural resources, countries such as Angola and Sierra Leone are
classified as incompatibilities concerning government. This neglect of natural
resources is stunning, given that a recent World Bank study found that “the ex-
tent of primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of
conflict.”5 Three-quarters of sub-Saharan African states still rely on primary
commodities for half or more of their export income.6
Our focus here is on how the global economic incentives surrounding valu-
able natural resources facilitate and influence intrastate conflicts. One leading
scholar has observed that “viewing the international system in terms of unsettled
resource deposits . . . provides a guide to likely conflict zones in the twenty-first
century.”7 Nonetheless, the argument advanced here does not extend to tradi-
tional interstate conflicts (water wars in the Middle East), let alone systemwide
strategic geopolitics (great-power conflicts in the Caspian and South China
Seas). Natural resources are increasingly important determinants of contempo-
rary violence; they will not, however, necessarily produce “a new geography of
conflict, a reconfigured cartography in which resource flows rather than politi-
cal and ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines.”8
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TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF NATURAL-RESOURCE CONFLICT
The diversity of civil wars is widely noted. One theorist observes, “The reasons
for which civil wars are fought, the levels of organization among the various
contesting parties, the degree of involvement by external powers and the politi-
cal outcomes of such contests have all varied widely.”9 Much the same can be said
for the smaller subset of natural-resource conflicts. These conflicts vary widely
along a number of dimensions, including culture, religion, and location (cases
can be found in Africa, Asia, and Latin America); the nature of the resource be-
ing contested (e.g., diamonds in Sierra Leone, hardwood forest products in
Cambodia, oil in Nigeria); and the nature of the participants (degrees and types
of corporate involvement, the presence or absence of organized opposition
groups). We can construct a typology of natural-resource conflicts by focusing
on three different variables: the nature of the resource being contested, the public-
private composition of the resource extractors and the security providers, and
the nature of the instigators and targets of violence.
The nature of the resource being contested and, specifically, how capital-
intensive its extraction is influences the form that natural-resource conflicts
take. As one observer notes, “Economic violence among rebels is more likely
when natural resources can be exploited with minimal technology and without
the need to control the capital or machinery of the state.”10 Thus, rebels are more
likely to be able to fund their operations from easily mined gems than they are to
control more capital-intensive processes, such as oil extraction. Angola was an
interesting example of this phenomenon, in that the late Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA
rebels were concentrated in areas where diamonds could be mined easily with
minimal equipment and sold by the briefcase or small plane load at a time while
the government depended on revenues from the much more capital-intensive
oil industry to fund its war effort. Thus, one is more likely to see a weak state los-
ing control of its territory and calling in private-military assistance, à la Sierra
Leone, when easily mined gems or minerals are at stake. Conversely, situations in
which large corporations find themselves dependent on the protection of state
security forces are more likely when the extraction of lucrative resources (like
oil) requires huge investments.
Obviously, this “easily mined”/“capital-intensive” dichotomy is not absolute.
One cannot, for example, rule out the possibility of large corporations involved
in the extraction of surface mineral deposits or guerilla forces directing their ef-
forts toward capital-intensive industries. By one estimate, Colombian guerillas
attacked pipelines and other oil industry infrastructure 985 times between 1986
and 1996.11 The type of resource involved does, however, suggest the likely na-
ture of the resource extractors and security providers, as well as the instigators
and targets of violence.
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The mixture of public and private involvement in the extraction of resources
and the provision of security can be visualized in a two-by-two matrix (see the
table) where the columns represent the resource extractors and the rows repre-
sent the security providers. Each category can be divided into public and private
participants.
Moving in a clockwise direction from top left, it is the second box (corpora-
tions depending on state security services) and the fourth box (states depending
on private military companies) that have received the most academic attention
to date, albeit in isolation from one another. The purely public activities in
the first box have traditionally been viewed solely in terms of domestic hu-
man rights abuses, while the purely private activities in the third box have
generally been discreet enough to escape attention. Viewing natural-resource
conflicts in terms of such a ma-
trix breaks down the artificial
separation between similar phe-
nomena—that is, the second and
fourth boxes.
The third dimension to con-
sider in constructing a typology
of natural-resource conflicts
concerns the participants, insti-
gators, and targets of violence.
An important distinction here
is between violence that is uni-
directional and violence that is
multidirectional. In this sense, “unidirectional” refers to violence that flows
primarily in one direction—from an instigator to a target. “Multidirectional”
refers to violence that flows back and forth between competing parties. These
categories should be seen as ideal types representing different ends of a contin-
uum, with many points in between. For example, the violence directed against
the Ogoni in Nigeria was unidirectional in the sense that the Ogoni were the re-
cipients of violence (more than two thousand civilians were killed) but were not
instigators of violence (no Shell employees or Nigerian security personnel are
known to have been killed by the Ogoni). The violence in Colombia, on the
other hand, has tended to be multidirectional—comprising, for instance, gov-
ernment violence against rebels, rebel violence against the government, rebel vi-
olence against corporations, and corporate financial support for government
violence against rebels.
The participants also vary. In some countries, like Colombia and Sierra Le-
one, sovereign governments face viable, well-organized competitors. In such
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geria; Total & Unocal in












security forces (box 3)
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situations, state officials and private corporations may act both as instigators
and targets of violence. In other cases, such as Ecuador and the Niger Delta, the
competitors that sovereign authorities face are seeking better terms from the ex-
ploitation of natural resources on their land but do so primarily through peace-
ful means. In these cases, indigenous host communities are likely to be the
primary targets of violence.
LINKING RESOURCES AND VIOLENCE
In discussing the dynamics of for-profit violent resource extraction, it is impor-
tant to consider what is and is not new about this process. While there have been
some important changes since the end of the Cold War, there are also definite
historical continuities. The practice seen in Nigeria by which state troops protect
corporate operations goes back at least as far as 1707, when the German state of
Wurttemberg provided troops to the Dutch East India Company.12 The same
company also hired Japanese mercenaries to subdue local opposition to its dom-
inance of the spice trade in what is now Indonesia.13 Describing the rubber
boom in the Belgian Congo, one leading historian observes that “the entire sys-
tem was militarized. Force Publique garrisons were scattered everywhere, often
supplying their firepower to the companies under contract. In addition, each
company had its own militia force.”14 Contemporary cases thus have long histor-
ical antecedents.
The end of the Cold War has, however, brought about changes that account
for the seemingly increased importance of natural resources to both sovereign
authorities and their nonsovereign challengers. In particular, faced with super-
power disengagement and a more liberalized world economy, both sovereign
and nonsovereign leaders have been forced to adopt market-oriented strategies
in order to survive.
In and of themselves, lucrative commodities are not either creative or de-
structive forces. They do, however, seem to encourage particularly poor policy
making on the part of government leaders. The fact that many diverse states that
are richly endowed with resources have produced dismal economic and political
results has variously been described as the “resource curse thesis” and the “para-
dox of plenty.”15 In terms of sovereign states, while the resource curse has a num-
ber of different aspects, we will focus on three here: the internationalization,
centralization, and privatization of the state.16 In the interaction of these three
factors one can find reasons why lucrative natural resources often encourage
state rulers to embrace violence.
The internationalization of a state signifies the increasing dependence of state
leadership, particularly in the absence of Cold War superpower backing, upon
the revenue earned by such fully internationalized commodities as diamonds,
8 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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oil, and hardwood forest products. Such commodities are “fully international-
ized” in the sense that their revenues are derived from the external global econ-
omy and are paid in dollars. The presence of such hard currency rents obviates
the needs for domestic taxation and state building. This internationalization
strategy is appealing, because “the ruler finds that encouraging these various
external actors to align themselves with his political network’s private interests
maximizes the resources available to clients, reinforces his personal capacity
to control resource distribution and hence increases the political authority at
his command.”17
A state becomes centralized “as a mechanism of accumulation and distribu-
tion.”18 In most tropical countries, the state claims exclusive ownership over
valuable natural resources. The monies earned from these commodities are fre-
quently paid directly into the central government’s treasury. Local and regional
authorities tend to have little, if any, claim on these revenue streams. In Nigeria,
for example, the percentage of
revenue allocated to regions of
derivation declined from 50 per-
cent at independence to a low of
1.5 percent in the early 1990s (it is
presently 13 percent). The central-
ized receipt of natural-resource revenue encourages corruption and cronyism.
The state is simultaneously amplified and destabilized as central power increases
but “is typically combined with weak authority and limited administrative and in-
stitutional capacity in the context of intense competition for state resources.”19
Finally, a state is privatized in the sense that rulers increasingly abjure formal
bureaucracies and institutions in favor of their own, personalized networks of
control. The result is the emergence of “strong networks of complicity between
public and private-sector actors” outside formal state institutions.20 The wealth
generated from such networks is then translated into political resources to re-
ward cronies and punish enemies.
Leaders of internationalized, centralized, and privatized resource-rich states
depend upon commercially successful exploitation of natural resources for their
survival. This dependence upon the revenue streams generated by natural re-
sources promotes and encourages violence. The frequent end result of such
vested interest in the efficient and uninterrupted exploitation of profitable re-
sources is that “militaries, paramilitary organizations, and state agencies often
create or exacerbate resource-based conflicts by their participation in protective
activities, their involvement as actors, or their coercive tactics.”21
The ending of Cold War financial support also shifted the calculus of guerilla
movements in a more market-oriented direction. As one observer points out,
P E G G 8 7
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the decline in external support and patronage “has not led guerrilla movements
to conclude that they should stop fighting: it has just made them realize that
their war economies have to change completely.”22 Thus, rather than trying to
woo foreign patrons, opposition groups have increasingly focused on control-
ling remunerative commodities that can be traded globally. Gems and diamonds
are ideal, in that they are easy to extract, can be transported economically, and, at
least after processing, are difficult to identify by region of origin. Successful ex-
amples can be found throughout Africa. Between 1992 and 1998, UNITA ob-
tained an estimated minimum revenue of $3.72 billion from diamond sales.23 In
the early 1990s, Charles Taylor’s “Greater Liberia” earned an estimated eight to
ten million dollars a month from various corporations extracting rubber, tim-
ber, iron ore, gold, and diamonds from territory it controlled.24 Based on their
demonstrated and long-standing abilities to finance themselves, one suspects
that former warlords like Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor make reliable busi-
ness partners.
The shift toward natural resources–based funding for rebel groups has had
two distinct results, both of which lead to increased levels of violence. First, this
shift has encouraged a fragmentation and proliferation in the number of rebel
groups. Control over lucrative natural resources increases local actors’ freedom
of maneuver. During the Cold War, rebels had incentives to remain united—to
assure outside supporters and enjoy the benefits of external funding, which usu-
ally came through a centralized channel. Today, however, financing “is directly
raised at a local level by individuals who have less and less reason to accept the
control of any hierarchy or authority.”25 This change is reinforced by the prolif-
eration in light arms and the resulting buyers’ market for such weapons: “Indi-
viduals and small groups can now easily purchase and wield relatively massive
amounts of power.”26 The second shift concerns changes in the types of rebel
groups. Employing a distinction between “stationary” and “roving” bandits, one
scholar argues that the participants in today’s resource-based conflicts are in-
creasingly likely to be of the roving variety. Whereas stationary bandits depend
on the prosperity of their host communities and thus have reason to establish vi-
able systems of governance, roving bandits “merely extract resources from areas
and move on. They will therefore tend to be extremely predatory and destruc-
tive.”27 This argument is correct about the predatory nature of today’s rebel
groups but wrong, at least in the context of natural-resource conflicts, about
who it is that has to “move on”—it is the local civilian population that is forced
to flee. Thus, the traditional guerilla emphasis on winning popular support has
given way to a more vicious strategy of territorial control through population
displacement.28 The growth in the number of rebel groups and their increasingly
8 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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predatory nature contribute to the escalation of violence surrounding natural-
resource extraction.
While both states and rebel groups have incentives for violence, each ulti-
mately depends upon the availability of willing corporate partners if it is to
transform resources under its control into hard currency. Conflict-ridden tropi-
cal countries would initially appear to be unappealing locations for foreign in-
vestment. Poor enforcement of property rights and inability to guarantee
physical and legal protection of assets effectively bar entry for most service and
manufacturing firms. As one theorist maintains, “the former requires a govern-
ment that can enforce property rights and prosecute infringement on them. The
latter requires political stability that allows foreign business to operate and re-
coup investments.”29 Such concerns do not, however, affect self-sufficient,
self-contained resource-extraction operations to the same degree. These en-
claves do not depend on local firms as suppliers, nor do they require local mar-
kets for their goods. Their basic requirements are just secure working facilities
and access to ports or airports from which their products can be transported to
the global marketplace. The cash flow generated by lucrative resource extraction
means that “firms earning resource rents can afford to pay criminal gangs, pri-
vate militias, or nascent rebel armies for the private enforcement of their prop-
erty rights while still earning a normal profit.”30 Such firms can also, as in the
second quadrant of our table, afford to pay “field allowances” to sovereign mili-
taries and, if necessary, purchase weapons for them.
The ability to cordon off operations from problems in the local economy and
the fact that resource-extraction firms must go where the resources are allow
these companies to bear political risks of a different order of magnitude than
other firms will consider—thus Shell’s decision in November 1995 to announce
a three-to-four-billion-dollar in-
vestment in Nigeria a week after
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other
Ogoni leaders were hanged, and
the continued refusal of compa-
nies like Total and Unocal to disengage from Burma long after other well known
firms, like Levi Strauss, Motorola, and Pepsi, have done so. As one former oil ex-
ecutive puts it, for a resource-extraction firm, “dealing with the regime in place,
regardless of its nature, is comparable to dealing with the owner of a property
which is needed for a project.”31 One might add that the “regime in place” may or
may not be a recognized sovereign government.
The interesting question here is just how much of a role corporations play in
the violence surrounding natural-resource conflicts. As one leading scholar ar-
gues, much of the “resource curse” literature treats criminal gangs and private
P E G G 8 9
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militias as exogenous—that is, the decision of resource firms to employ them
does not influence the strength, prevalence, or behavior of such groups. Yet in
settings where the rule of law is already tenuous, “the presence of resource firms
may help these groups form (or enable preexisting groups to expand) by giving
them lucrative opportunities for extortion. Just as the presence of monopoly
rents tends to foster rent-seeking behavior, the presence of resource rents may
foster the rise of extralegal organizations that seek out ‘protection rents.’”32
While this argument focuses exclusively on “extralegal organizations,” the
second box in our table (private resource extractors, public security providers)
illustrates that this logic applies equally well to sovereign security forces that
take advantage of these “lucrative opportunities for extortion.” Some resource-
extraction firms subcontract their security functions to rebel groups or private
military companies; others utilize sovereign armies. The underlying logic re-
mains the same.
Another way of framing this question is to ask whether corporations actively
play a role in creating, maintaining, or exacerbating violence or whether, as the
firms themselves would have it, they are merely innocent bystanders, complying
with all relevant domestic regulations. In fact, and even beyond the enormous fi-
nancial support they offer governments and rebel movements, the centrality of
corporations in creating and exacerbating security threats to local populations
can be demonstrated in two main ways.
First, corporations have a catalytic effect, tending to bring local populations into
confrontation with military forces. Looking specifically at oil companies, in the
Burmese case it is estimated that the troops stationed where the Yadana natural-
gas pipeline was constructed increased from five battalions in 1990 to more than
fourteen in 1996.33 In the Nigerian case, it was corporate actions, such as pollut-
ing the environment and refusing to pay compensation for such pollution, that
led to community protests in the first place. On numerous occasions, such com-
munity protests have brought security-force abuses, often “right next to
company property or in the immediate aftermath of meetings between company
officials and individual claimants or community representatives.”34 Perhaps the
ultimate expression of this corporations-as-catalysts logic comes from the Su-
dan. The correlation there between planned corporate oil-exploration sites and
subsequent Sudanese military offensives is striking:
Military operations against rebel forces in Western Upper Nile and military opera-
tions designed to secure the oil fields are not distinct from one another. In fact, they
are the same. Oil facilities and infrastructure are de facto military facilities, the oil
fields are the most heavily militarized locations, oil company property and personnel
are viewed as military targets by rebel forces and indigenous rural communities are
considered security threats by forces protecting oil company property.35
9 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Second, companies can have a direct effect on the security of local host com-
munities. Oil companies have been accused of purchasing weapons for state se-
curity services in Colombia and Nigeria. They have also (in Burma and Nigeria)
transported military troops in
their helicopters and boats and
(in the Sudan) shared airport fa-
cilities with helicopter gunships.
Furthermore, corporations may
make specific requests for military assistance, or not, as they choose. Oil compa-
nies have directly requested assistance from the Nigerian security services in a
number of episodes that have subsequently resulted in the deaths of nonviolent
protestors.36 These companies claim credit for the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes when they ask the military authorities not to intervene forcibly. Yet they
disclaim responsibility for fatalities when they do request intervention, arguing
that they are required to do so by domestic law. Companies are not powerless ac-
tors. They make choices that directly affect the security or insecurity of local
populations.
Unlike state leaders and guerilla groups, however, corporations are arguably
the only leg of this tripod of actors on which in recent years incentives for less vi-
olent behavior have increased. In 1997, following a torrent of bad publicity in
the wake of the Ogoni hangings in 1995, Royal Dutch/Shell became the first en-
ergy company publicly to declare support for the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. The following year, the company explicitly addressed human rights
issues in the first of a series of annual reports on the firm’s financial, social, and
environmental responsibilities.37 Texaco withdrew from operations in Burma in
1997. De Beers has recently announced plans to transform the way it conducts
its business in the wake of mounting public opposition to its purchase of dia-
monds from rebel groups in Angola and Sierra Leone.38
The extent of such changes should not, however, be exaggerated. The British
firm Premier Oil, for example, chose to remain in Burma for more than two
years after the British government took the unprecedented step in April 2000 of
asking it to withdraw from the country.39 TotalFinaElf and Unocal still remain in
Burma today. The Malaysian state oil company Petronas maintains investments
in Angola, Burma, Chad, and war-torn southern Sudan. Even after the bad pub-
licity surrounding Shell’s links to the Nigerian military, Chevron transported
military troops on two separate occasions in 1998 and 1999 that resulted in the
deaths of unarmed civilians.40 When asked at a shareholders meeting in May
1999 whether the company would officially demand that the Nigerian military
not shoot protestors at Chevron facilities, the chairman and chief executive offi-
cer gave a one-word response: “No.”41
P E G G 9 1
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IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND SCHOLARSHIP
Conflicts surrounding the extraction of lucrative natural resources are becom-
ing increasingly prevalent, but there are two particular reasons for caution be-
fore a decision to intervene. First, local rebel and guerilla movements consider
the large revenue streams generated by natural resources worth fighting for.
While such forces may not pose serious operational risks for the U.S. military,
the possibility is very real of daring raids or ambushes meant to produce a few
dozen U.S. casualties, as in Somalia, to undermine civilian support for the inter-
vention. Second, and perhaps more importantly, engagement in such conflicts
potentially opens U.S. forces to serious risks with respect to public relations and
reputation. Activists, nongovernmental organizations, and what some observers
have labeled “transnational advocacy networks” have proven increasingly adept
at networking with local host communities in oil-rich regions like the Niger
Delta and southern Chad and at “telling their story” to the outside world.42 As
local residents in such areas typically live in abject poverty, without access to
piped drinking water or electricity, when billions of dollars of (say) oil wealth
are being taken from their lands, that story is likely to resonate well. It is not dif-
ficult to envision a scenario in which U.S. forces intervening to preserve access to
oil or other vital mineral supplies end up being portrayed, rightly or wrongly, as
the military wing of large transnational corporations or as willing accomplices
of corrupt and repressive regimes like those in Angola or the Democratic Re-
public of Congo. The public relations aspects of natural-resource conflicts will
likely prove far more challenging for U.S. forces than the military, operational,
or strategic aspects.
In terms of general policy, such bold and dramatic suggestions as the recent
proposal to manage global resource stockpiles collaboratively, through the es-
tablishment of new international organizations, seem implausible.43 Instead, the
greatest leverage for improvement lies perhaps in pressuring private-sector ac-
tors to end their complicity in the violent extraction of lucrative natural re-
sources. This strategy is certainly not guaranteed to succeed, but there are clear
cases in which large corporations have changed (or at least acknowledged the
need to change) their behavior. As a group, private-sector actors would seem
more amenable to moral suasion than are either state leaders or guerillas.
There is the danger, however, that larger corporations obliged by public pres-
sure to disengage from volatile regions will simply subcontract that business to
smaller and less scrupulous operators. This was one of Shell’s responses to calls
to pull out of Nigeria: “If we leave,” the company said in effect, “the oil will still
be taken out, but by companies that are less open to responsible dialogue than
we are.” On one hand, this argument should be rejected summarily. As one phi-
losopher comments on oil investment in the Sudan, “Providing strategic
9 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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resources and moral cover to a regime which is committing crimes against hu-
manity . . . is wrong. No one should be involved in it, regardless of what anyone
else does.”44 On the other hand, however offensive and self-serving such a corpo-
rate rationale, there is some truth to it. While companies like Shell and Chevron
may have much to answer for, fly-by-night proxies are not necessarily desirable
alternatives. Indeed, in companies like Petronas and Unocal we may already be
seeing the emergence of a new breed of second-tier transnationals with business
models premised on their comparative advantage in unsavory markets where
more socially responsible companies fear to tread. Still, the conclusion remains
that for those concerned with improving human and environmental conditions in
resource-rich regions, private-sector corporations offer the best prospect for posi-
tive movement of any of the three legs of the violent-resource-extraction triangle.
A number of theoretical implications also emerge. The first is the need to direct
analytical attention toward the economic rationality underlying these conflicts.
Theoretical explanations that focus on ancient hatreds or primordial ethnic dif-
ferences are unlikely to be of much use in explaining the market-oriented behav-
ior of participants in violent, for-profit extraction of natural resources.
While much of the academic international relations literature has focused on
“failed” or “collapsed” states, the dynamics of natural-resource conflicts suggest
a different focus. A more fruitful avenue of inquiry might be the de facto privat-
ization of the state by warlords, state leaders, and their global corporate part-
ners. Very few states actually collapse. Even those that do, like Cambodia,
Lebanon, and Somalia, are propped up juridically by the international society of
sovereign states, which has a compelling interest in their at least nominal preser-
vation. The institution of sovereignty is not in widespread decline and we
should not expect to see large numbers of states collapsing in the coming years:
“The main danger lies less in the disappearance of States than in their takeover
by business interests.”45 Juridical states will continue to survive; the idea and
practice of the nation-state, however, “will become ever more marginal to deals
negotiated between local chiefs and transnationals, an imbalance in bargaining
power if ever there was one.”46
Theories of international relations are often presented in universal terms. In
reality, their relevance may be limited to very specific regions or time periods.47
The insights generated by our focus on natural resource–related conflicts do not
apply globally. Such factors as the simultaneous internationalization, centraliza-
tion, and privatization of the state, and pressure on opposition groups to shift
toward more market-oriented strategies, simply are not present in many in-
stances. Nonetheless, if whatever theories are ultimately developed to explain
the link between violence and resources are not universal, they will be relatively
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broadly applicable across an equatorial belt of resource-rich states in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America.
Moving beyond this preliminary exploration of the conceptual issues sur-
rounding natural resource–related conflicts, one of the first tasks would be to re-
fine the typologies employed here and to see what (if any) generalizations,
however contingent, emerge from them. In other words, is the violence sur-
rounding natural resources higher or lower, or more or less amenable to peace-
ful settlement, when certain types of actors or resources are involved? Are there
contingent generalizations that hold across particular subsets or types of natural
resource–related conflicts?
A goal for further research should be to clarify how broadly or narrowly such
contingent generalizations apply. It is still an open question whether or not
economies based on commodities other than oil, like those of Botswana or
Papua New Guinea, can fruitfully be compared to those of petro-states like Iraq
and Venezuela.48 Can all resource-rich or mineral-exporting states be treated
similarly, or do, for example, diamond states have distinctly different dynamics
than oil states? Recent empirical work suggests that both oil and other non-oil
resources have strong and substantive anti-democratic effects, but clearly more
needs to be done here.49 Similarly, there is a potential selection bias at work to-
ward cases like Angola, Burma, Colombia, and Sierra Leone. The danger here is
that “in examining only cases of conflict, one is likely to find at least partial con-
firmation of whatever one is looking for.”50 To address this problem, further re-
search needs to be conducted into the question of why some resource-rich
countries, like Botswana and Chile, have been able to avoid such conflict.
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